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itself, violate the ban on sex discrimination contained in Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.70 The court stated: 
The threshold question is whether disparity of treatment between 
pregnancy-related disabilities can be classified as discrimination based on 
sex. If, as footnote 20 [in Geduldig] seems to suggest, it cannot be so 
classified, then the further question of whether such disparity is justified 
- or less justified in the employment context than in some other context 
- can never be reached.'l 
Thus, pregnant women appear to have lost the protection formerly 
guaranteed them under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This 
need not have occurred. In allowing California to refuse to insure 
coverage for pregnancy, the Court did not have to deny that discrimina- 
tion against pregnant women is sex discrimination. 
Constitutional Law - MOOTNESS -DeFunis v .  Odegaard, 41 6 U.S. 3 12 
(1 974). 
Marco DeFunis applied for admission to the University of Washington 
Law School for the 197 1-72 school year but was denied admittance.' 
After his rejection, DeFunis, a white, learned that several minority appli- 
cants had been preferentially considered and accepted with lower 
academic qualifications than his.2 
DeFunis commenced an action in a Washington state court seeking to 
compel his admission. The trial court granted DeFunis a temporary 
injunction allowing him to enter law school in September of 197 1, and 
subsequently ruled that the admissions procedures violated the equal 
protection clause.3 The Supreme Court of Washington reversed the 
lower court, ruling DeFunis had not demonstrated, as a matter of fact, 
that the law school's admissions procedures were unconstitutional.4 The 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari5 and the judgment of 
-- - 
7042 U.S.C. 5 2000e-2(a) (1970). 
CCH EMP. PRACT. G. at 5639. 
'The class was to be limited to 150 students; 1601 applications were received. 416 U.S. 312, 
314 (1974). 
2Certain minority groups are given preferential treatment by the admissions committee. 
These groups include Black, Chicano, Native, and Filipino Americans. In determining the 
probability of success in law school, less weight was placed on the grade-point averages and 
admission test scores of members of these groups than of other applicants. DeFunis v. Ode- 
gaard, 82 Wash. 2d 1121,507 P.2d 1169,1175 (1973) (en banc). 
3DeFunis v. Odegaard, No. 741727 (Wash. Super. Ct. King Co. 1971) (oral decision), found 
in 1 A. GINGER, DEFUNIS VERSUS ODEGAARD AND THE UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, THE UNIVER- 
SITY ADMISSIONS CASE 1 15 (1974). 
482 Wash. 2d 11,507 P.2d 1169 (1973) (en banc). 
5414 U.S. 1038 (1973). 
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the washington Supreme Court was stayed until final disposition of the 
case, thus permitting DeFunis to remain in school.6 
By the time set for oral argument DeFunis had already registered for 
his final quarter of law school. In a per curiam opinion, the Court de- 
clared the case moot and declined to rule on the merits "because the 
petitioner will complete his law school studies at the end of the term for 
which he is now registered regardless of any decision the Court might 
reach on the merits of the litigation."' 
Mootness has its origin in the common law doctrine that courts are 
powerless to render opinions where no actual controversy exists8 and is 
predicated on the proposition that "federal courts are without power to 
decide questions that cannot affect the rights of the litigants in the case 
before them."g A case is moot when, after initial compliance with ripe- 
ness10 and standing" requirements, subsequent events such as settle- 
6The stay was issued by Mr. Justice Douglas as Circuit Justice in the Ninth Circuit. 416 
U.S. at 315. 
' Id .  at 319-20. 
8Mills v. Green 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895); See Note, 53 HARV. L. &v. 628 (1940); Note, 34 
HARV. L. &v. 416 (1921). 
sNorth Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971). The policy of the Court has always been 
to hear only cases involving concrete disagreements between parties actually at odds and to 
avoid expending limited judicial resources on abstract questions or hypothetical situations. 
See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968) (the case or controversy requirement should "limit 
the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in form 
historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process"); Marye v. Parsons, 
114 U.S. 325, 330 (1884); Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 251, 255 (1850). Compare Bickel, 
T h e  Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Forward: T h e  Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. &v. 40 (1961) 
(Professor Bickel suggests the Court make more advantageous use of the doctrines to effec- 
tively regulate its caseload) with Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 
73 HARV. L. h v .  1, 9 (1959) (Professor Wels ler  offers the view that "the only proper judg- 
ment that may lead to an abstention from decision is that the Constitution has committed the 
determination of the issue to another agency of government than the courts"). 
lOThe doctrine of ripeness requires that the plaintiff must have already suffered or be in 
imminent threat of injury before an action may be brought. See United Public Workers v. 
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1946). 
T h e  power of courts, and ultimately of this court, to pass upon the Constitutionality of 
acts of Congress arises only when the interests of litigants require the use of this judicial 
authority for their protection against actual interference. A hypothetical threat is not 
enough. 
Id.  at 89-90. Accord, International Longshoreman's Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (1953); K. 
DAVIS, ADMINISTRAIWE LAW TREATISE 160-62 (3d ed. 1972); Davis, Ripeness of Governmental 
Action for Judicial Reoiew, 68 HARV. L. &v. 1122, 1133 (1955). 
"Standing is required of plaintiffs as a necessary element of the case or controversy require- 
ment in all types of actions. See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 39 (2d ed. 1970). In Baker v .  
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), standing was characterized in the following manner: 
Have the appellants alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as 
to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which 
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions? This 
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ment by the parties,12 a change in the law,l3 or the passage of time14 
obviate the need for adjudication because a decision would no longer 
directly affect the parties.l5 The justifications most frequently given 
for the mootness doctrine are: ( I )  prevention of unnecessary use of 
judicial resources;l6 (2) assurance of sufficient adverseness for issues to 
be competently and forcefully presented on both sides of a dispute;l7 and 
(3) avoidance of unnecessary precedent. '8 
is the gist of standing. 
Id. at 188. A plaintiff must have been injured or be subject to future injury in order to have 
standing to sue. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (a taxpayer, for example, may have standing 
if there is a sufficient nexus between his status as a taxpayer and the alleged wrongful activity); 
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (a landowner may have standing to contest the 
erection of an amusement park on his land, but a concerned environmentalist onlooker may 
lack a sufficient stake in the dispute to have standing). See also United States ex re1 Chapman 
v. Federal Power Comm'n, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953); Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others 
35 U. CHI. L. REV. 601 (1968). 
12Stewart v. Southern Ry., 315 U.S. 283, 284 (1942) (case remanded to district court with 
directions that it be dismissed as moot because the parties had settled); Danciger Oil and Refin- 
ing Co. v. Smith, 290 U.S. 599 (1933) (upon settlement case remanded "with directions to dis- 
miss. . . upon the ground that the cause is moot"). 
13Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969) (change in voting durational residency requirements from 
six to two months removed plaintiffs from the injured class); United States v. Alaska Steamship 
Co., 253 U.S. 113 (1920) (passage of the Transportation Act of 1920 eliminated the alleged 
wrong, hence an injunction was no longer needed to protect the complainants). 
l4Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1952) (case declared moot because 
child in question had graduated from public school before appeal was taken to the Court); 
Atherton Mills v. Johnston, 259 U.S. 13, 15-16 (1922) ("The lapse of time since the case was 
heard. . . has brought the minor. . . to an age which is not .  . . affected by the act. The Act, 
even if valid, cannot affect him further."). 
15See A. L. Mechling Barge Lines, Inc. v. United States, 368 U.S. 324, 329, n. 11 (1961) 
("the challenged order is now only of academic interest. . . ."); California v. San Pablo and T. 
R. Co. 149 U.S. 308, 341 (1893) ("the court is not empowered to decide moot questions or 
abstract propositions.. .which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case 
before it"). See also Note, 17 DEPAUL L. REV. 590 (1968); Note, Cases Moot on Appeal: A 
Limit of the Judicial Power, 103 U. PA. L. J. 772 (1955). 
16See, e.g., Note, Mootness on Appeal in the Supreme Court, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1672, 1675 
(1970) ("The rationale for this limitation (mootness) is often stated in terms of judicial econ- 
omy."); Note, 53 HARV. L. REV. 628, 629 (1940) ("In part the doctrine is based on the court's 
desire not to waste time in the futile decision of abstract questions . . . ."); Note, Cases i n  Equity 
That  Become Moot on Appeal, 34 HARV. L. REV. 416, 417-18 (1920) ("Underlying all the 
decisions, however, is the perhaps laudable fear that courts will waste valuable time in render- 
ing opinions that will serve no useful purpose except the satisfaction of one litigant's will to 
win."); Note, Cases Moot on Appeal: A Limit on the Judicial Power, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 772, 
775 (1955) ("courts prefer not to enter decrees which will have no effect on the present status 
of the parties, and will dismiss such cases in order to devote their time to the decision of live 
controversies"). 
17East Tenn., Va. & Ga. R.R. v. Southern Tel. Co. 125 U.S. 695 (1888); Diamond, Federal 
Jurisdiction to Decide Moot Cases, 94 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 130 (1946); Note, Mootness o n  
Appeal in  the Supreme Court, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1672, 1677-78 (1970); Note, 53 HARV. L. REV. 
628, 630 n.13 (1940); Note, Declaratory Judgments in the Federal Courts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 
1351, 1352 (1936) (No court may decide moot cases since it is the "sole function of courts to 
adjudicate issues of present rights actually disputed by adverse parties."). 
18See note, T h e  Mootness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 88 HARV. L. REV. 373, 376 n.14 
(1974) ("Another purpose served by the mootness doctrine is the preservation of flexibility in 
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Today, mootness is considered a doctrine of constitutional dimen- 
sions based in article III1g which limits the judicial power of the federal 
courts to "cases or controversies. "20 Parties must have adverse legal posi- 
tions related to a real dispute at all stages of appellate review if a review- 
ing court is to have j~risdiction.2~ Thus, not only must a litigant initially 
demonstrate the existence of an actual controversy but also must demon- 
strate that a controversy continues to exist throughout the duration of 
the lawsuit.22 
By its interpretation of the "case or controversy" requirement, the 
Court has retained considerable flexibility and discretion in determin- 
ing whether a case remains j~sticiable.~3 In exercising this discretion, 
the Court has created certain exceptions to the mootness rule. Although 
it is difficult to determine the exact parameters of such exceptions,24 
certain categories are fairly well defi11ed.~5 These exceptions include 
the law by not creating unnecessary precedent."), citing P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, AND 
H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 110 (2d 
ed. 1973). See also Note, 53 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1940). 
IgThe courts have not always considered mootness a constitutional doctrine. "Inasmuch 
as no case in the federal courts has ever mentioned the federal Constitution in this connection 
(mootness), it seems that there is no definite constitutional mandate against a decision on the 
merits." Note, Cases in Equity That Become Moot On Appeal, 34 HARV. L. REV. 416, 417 
(1920). 
In recent years the Court has connected the mootness doctrine directly with the article 111 
case or controversy requirement. Liner v. Jafco, 375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964) ("Our lack of 
jurisdiction to review moot cases derives from the requirement of Article I11 of the Constitu- 
tion under which the exercise of judicial power depends upon the existence of a case or con- 
troversy.") (citing Diamond, Federal Jurisdiction to Decide Moot Cases, 94 U. PA. L. REV. 
125 (1946); Note, Cases Moot on Appeal: A Limit on the Judicial Power, 103 U .  PA. L. REV. 
772 (1955). See also S.E.C. v. Medical Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 407 (1972); 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,496 n.7 (1969); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40,57 (1968) 
(there exists a "constitutional rule against entertaining moot controversies"). 
20See U.S. Const. art. 111,s 2; A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 114 (1962); HARRIS, 
THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES (1940); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS, 34-38 (2d ed. 
1970); Bork, Neutral Principles and 1st Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Note, 
The Non-justiciable Controversy, 48 VA. L. REV. 922 (1962). 
21North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244,246 (1971). 
22While standing and ripeness are concerned with whether an actual controversy exists 
initially, mootness is concerned with whether an actual controversy continues to exist. See 
notes 10 & 11 supra. Because the mootness inquiry is usually raised only after a court has 
been satisfied that the litigant has made a colorable allegation of injury, it has been sug- 
gested that in considering mootness the Court has more leeway than in determining standing 
or ripeness. Note, Mootness in the Supreme Court, 88 HARV. L. REV. 373,377-78 (1974). 
23See, e-g., Flast v. Cohen 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968); Note, The Mootness Doctrine in The 
Supreme Court, 88 HARV. L. REV. 373, 377 (1974) ("The broadly phrased case or controversy 
requirement leaves the Court with substantial discretion to determine whether a case is 
justiciable in borderline situations."). 
24See Note, Mootness on Appeal in the Supreme Court, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1672, 1673 (1970) 
("Fixed definition, categorization, and differentiation (of the mootness doctrine) are fruitless 
endeavors.") citing Diamond, Federal Jurisdiction to Decide Moot Cases, 94 U .  PA. L. REV. 
125, and Kates, Memorandum of Law of Mootness- Part 1,3 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 213 (1970). 
P5In addition to the exceptions treated in detail in this case note, another exception fre- 
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cases presenting issues of a recurring nature which evade review and cases 
where the defendant has voluntarily ceased to participate in the allegedly 
illegal activity. 
A.  Recurring Issues Which Evade Review 
Occasionally cases present recurring matters which, because of the 
limited time of actual controversy, would avoid adjudication or appellate 
review if no exception to the mootness rule were available.26 Examples 
of this type of situation include disputes over short-term licenses27 and 
short-term administrative orders28 which are moot at the appellate level 
because the licenses have expired or the orders have ceased to be opera- 
tive.29 Federal courts will consider such cases if it can be reasonably ex- 
pected that the parties to the action will become embroiled in a similar 
dispute in the future,S0 and if it is evident that the dispute will again be 
quently recognized by the courts is applied in cases where there exists a high likelihood that 
collateral consequences will adversely affect the aggrieved party in the future. Criminal 
defendants are the most frequent beneficiaries of this exception. Pollard v. United States, 
352 U.S. 354 (1957); United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512-13 (1954); Fiswick v. United 
States, 329 U.S. 21 1, 222 (1946); and Note, 53 VA. L. REV. 403 (1967). In Sibron v. New York, 
392 U.S. 40, (1968), for example, the defendant had completely served his six-month jail 
sentence by the time his appeal reached the United States Supreme Court, but the Court did 
not apply the mootness doctrine because of the "obvious fact of life that most criminal con- 
victions do in fact entail adverse collateral legal consequences." Id. at 55. The collateral 
consequence exception generally finds application only in criminal proceedings and, there- 
fore, has limited application in this case note. I t  should be noted, however, that the collateral 
consequences exception has on occasion been used in civil cases when a penalty or some form 
of disciplinary action is involved. See Scoggins v. Lincoln University, 291 F. Supp. 161 (W.D. 
Mo., 1968) and Estaban v. Central Missouri State College, 290 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Mo., 1968). 
See generally Singer, Justiciability and Recent Supreme Court Cases, 21 ALA. L. REV. 229, 258- 
63 (1969) (author suggests that the collateral consequences exception should apply in all 
civil as well as criminal cases). 
26Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1968); Carrol v. President, 393 U.S. 175 (1968); Southern 
Pacific v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498 (1910); United States v. W. T. Grant, Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953). 
27See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 200 U.S. 450 (1906); Securities Mutual Life Ins. Co. 
v. Prewitt, 200 U.S. 446 (1906). 
28See, e.g., Porter v. Lee, 328 U.S. 246, 251-52 (1946); Boise City Irr. & Land Co. v. Clark, 
131 Fed. 415,418-19 (9th Cir. 1904). 
29Due to the relatively short term of the licenses and orders involved, such cases invariably 
would be moot on appeal. As indicated in Note, Cases Moot on Appeal: A Limit on the 
Judicial Power, 103 U. PA.  L. REV. 772, 782-83 (1955) such cases were formerly dismissed as 
presenting no issue capable of adjudication, but today most courts will look beyond the 
effects of the expiration and allow the appeal on the merits if the denial may be of future con- 
sequence to the applicant. Compare Securities Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 200 U.S. 446, 
450 (1906), with Rayahel v. McCampell, 55 F.2d 221 (2d Cir., 1932) and Leonard & Leonard 
v. Earle, 279 U.S. 392, 398 (1929). 
3% determining whether to apply the repetitious issue exception, the Court is most con- 
cerned with the probability of recurrence of the allegedly wrongful conduct. The standard 
was set down in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pactjic Coal and Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941), 
where the Court refused to apply an exception to mootness in the absence of evidence that 
the prospect of a future dispute between the parties was one of "immediacy and reality." 
See, e.g., Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1969). (The plaintiff was seeking permis- 
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moot on appeal.3' In Southern Pactfic v. Interstate Commerce Commis- 
sion,32 for example, the parties were concerned with the validity of an 
ICC cease-and-desist order which was to last for 2 years. By the time 
the Supreme Court was to hear the case, the 2-year period had elapsed. 
The  Court nevertheless considered the merits of the case, reasoning that 
such short-term orders should be examined despite the termination of 
the particular order, because it was likely that similar orders would sub- 
sequently be issued, but would evade review if the mootness doctrine 
were strictly followed.33 
In Roe v. Wade 34 a recurring situation was presented where a woman 
initiated a class action questioning the constitutionality of an anti- 
abortion s ta t~ te .3~  Although the plaintiff was pregnant at the time the 
suit was filed, and thus had standing to bring suit, when the case reached 
the Supreme Court she was no longer pregnant and her case was tech- 
nically moot. The Court, however, applied the recurring issue exception 
and considered the merits and indicated that there existed a reasonable 
possibility that in the future the plaintiff or a member of the class she 
represented would be similarly situated, i.e., pregnant, and affected by 
the challenged statute.S6 Because the issue would again be moot upon 
reaching advanced appellate review, the Court concluded that the inter- 
ests of justice would not be served with so rigid an interpretation of the 
law as to "exclude cases with issues which would otherwise escape adjudi- 
cation. "37 
Central to the recurring issue exception applied in Southern Paclfic 
and Roe is the Court's view that the controversy between the parties was 
broader than the particular issues which had become moot. In such cir- 
cumstances, if an exception to mootness were not available, the aggrieved 
party would never be allowed his day in court despite the possibility of 
continual, though not continuous, interference with his rights. 
The Court does not always insist that the original plaintiff to the 
sion from the Court to distribute political pamphlets against a candidate for the state legis- 
lature. The case was dismissed as moot when it was brought to the court's attention that the 
candidate had accepted a judgeship which was to last for 14 years. The Court reasoned that 
it was "highly unlikely" that the dispute would recur in the future.). 
3lRoe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1968); Carroll 
v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 178-79 (1968); Southern Pacific v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 
(1910). 
32219 U.S. 498 (1911). 
331d. at 515. 
34410 U,S. 113 (1973). 
351d. at 120. 
36Zd. at 125. I t  is not clear from the Court's opinion whether the repetitious issue excep- 
tion was applicable only because the original plaintiff would again become pregnant or be- 
cause any member of the plaintiffs class could again become pregnant. The language 
"pregnancy often comes more than once to the same woman" suggests that the court was con- 
cerned with the rights of the entire class. Id. 
3'Zd. 
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action must be the person likely to be injured in subsequent disputes. 
In class actions such as Roe the Court has shown a willingness to apply 
the exception, even if the original plaintiff's personal dispute has be- 
come moot, as long as there is a reasonable possibility that someone in the 
plaintiff's class will be subject to similar injury in the future.38 
Even in the absence of a formal class action in compliance with federal 
standards, the Court occasionally has been willing to apply the recurring 
issue exception though the plaintiff has lost a personal interest in the 
dispute if the court considers the interests of a recognizable group to be at 
stake and sufficiently represented by the plaintiff. In Richardson v. 
R a r n i r e ~ , ~ ~  for example, three ex-felons brought suit questioning the 
constitutionality of a Califonria law which disenfranchised convicted 
felons. The defendants registered the plaintiffs to vote but the California 
Supreme Court rejected the contention that the case was moot viewing 
the case as a class action presenting a matter of "broad public interest, . . . 
likely to recur,"4O and subsequently invalidated the questioned law.41 The 
United States Supreme Court decided the case on its merits.* The Court 
determined that the case was not moot, and deemed significant the fact 
that the California Supreme Court had treated the case as a class action 
between all ex-felons and all election officials in the state.43 Similarly, 
ppp - - - - - 
38The Supreme Court, 1973 Term,  88 HARV. L. REV. 41, 107 (1974) (" [C] urrent practice i n  
the federal courts allows individuals who belonged to a class at the outset of litigation to con- 
tinue serving in a representative capacity after membership in the class has terminated, with- 
out regard to the applicability of exceptions to the mootness doctrine."); see note 67 infra. 
Another possible explanation for the Court's willingness to relax somewhat the require- 
ments for application of the recurring issue exception is the significant public interest in- 
volved in many actions which involve substantial numbers of people. See, e.g., American 
Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 770 n.1 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 737 n.8 (1974); 
Note, Mootness in the Supreme Court, 88 HARV. L. REV. 373, 388 (1974); Note, Mootness o n  
Appeal, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1672, 1685 (1970). Many state courts have recognized the judicial 
economy in deciding cases involving questions of great public interest when it is evident that 
the controversy meets the requirements for justiciability even though the case is moot as to 
the original plaintiff. State ex. rel. Steere v. Franklin County Farm Bureau, 172 Kan. 179, 
239 P.2d 570 (1951); Golden v. People ex rel. Baker, 101 Colo. 381, 74 P.2d 715 (1937); First 
National Bank v. State, 65 P.2d 1154 (Arizona, 1937); Pitt v. Belote, 108 Fla. 246, 146 S. 380 
(1935); Piper v. Hawley 179 Cal. 10, 175 P. 419 (California, 1918). Federal courts, however, 
will not allow public interest alone as sufficient grounds to allow determination of a moot 
dispute, even though public interest is frequently mentioned when considering application 
of an exception to mootness. 
39418 U S  24 (1974). 
40Ramirez v. Brown, 9 Cal. 3d 199, 216-17, 507 P.2d 1345, 1347, 107 Cal. Rptr. 137, 149 
(1973). 
41Zd. at 216-17,507 P.2d at 1347, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 149. 
42418 U.S. 24,37 (1974). 
43Zd. The Court stated that: 
[Wlhile the Supreme Court of California did not in so many words say that it was 
permitting respondents to proceed by way of a "class action," the fact that the Court's 
process recited that the named registrars were subject to it "individually and as repre- 
sentatives of the class of all other county clerks and registrars of voters," and the fact 
that the beneficiaries. . . were not merely the named appellants. . . indicates that the 
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lenged admissions policy, and since no class action had been filed there 
was no longer a "definite and concrete" controversy for adjudication. 
In considering whether an exception to the mootness rule should be 
applied, the Court reasoned that the voluntary cessation exception was 
inappropriate because the defendant had not ceased the conduct com- 
plained of by the plaintiff, rather, time and other circumstances had 
interacted to change the plaintiff's status to such an extent that the 
defendant's actions no longer affected him.57 The Court also held the 
recurring issue exception inapplicable since the plaintiff would soon 
graduate and never again be subjected to the admissions procedures, and 
it was unlikely the issue would "evade review" as a result of mootness if 
ever raised again.58 
Four justices dissented59 arguing that a continuing controversy existed 
in that something might prevent the plaintiff from finishing the term 
then placing him in a position to be denied readmission.60 The dissenters 
also argued that the voluntary cessation exception was applicable be- 
cause the defendant had voluntarily decided not to prevent the plaintiff's 
graduation and had failed to demonstrate there was not even a "mere 
possibility" that the plaintiff would be subjected to the challenged ad- 
missions poli~y.6~ 
571d. at 318. 
58Id. at 319. The Court implicitly recognized the great public interest in the case but 
declined to consider the merits on that basis alone. 
591d. at 348. 
6"Id. 
611d. at 349. The dissenters also urged that the public interest would be best served by an 
adjudication on the merits. Id. at 350. 
Upon concluding that the case was moot, the judgment was vacated and the cause re- 
manded to the Supreme Court of Washington "for such proceedings as by that court may 
be deemed appropriate." Id. at 320. I t  would also have been permissible for the Court to 
dismiss the appeal rather than vacate the lower court's judgment. The main justifications 
for vacating, as opposed to dismissing, the appeal are the possible collateral estoppel conse- 
quences if the lower court's judgment were permitted to stand, and the possibility of unjust 
unforeseen consequences. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950); New 
Orleans Flour Inspectors v. Glover, 160 U.S. 170 (1895); Comment, 23 U. CHI. L. h v .  77, 93 
(1955) ("The Supreme Court has apparently adopted reversal of the lower court judgment of 
the disposition for moot appeals in an effort to prevent unforeseen and undesirable effects.") 
It is unclear why the Court vacated the Washington Supreme Court's judgment in DeFunis. 
It  may have been because the Court did not want to give DeFunis stare decisis effect in Wash- 
ington. But, regardless of whether the decision was vacated or left standing, it will remain in 
the record and no doubt be referred to in the future. Comment, 23 U. CHI. L. &v. 77, 93 
(1955) ("If the opinion below is officially reported, it will always remain in the volume; even 
if the decision is vacated, the force of the reasoning remains."). 
I t  is also doubtful whether the Court has the authority to vacate a state judgment which 
has become moot on appeal since state courts are not bound by article 111's case or controversy 
requirement and are, therefore, free to make their own determinations as to mootness. North 
Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971); Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 304 (1964); Note, 
Mootness in the Supreme Court, 88 HARV. L. h v .  37 3, 393 n. 104 (1974). 
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action must be the person likely to be injured in subsequent disputes. 
In class actions such as Roe the Court has shown a willingness to apply 
the exception, even if the original plaintiff's personal dispute has be- 
come moot, as long as there is a reasonable possibility that someone in the 
plaintiff's class will be subject to similar injury in the future.38 
Even in the absence of a formal class action in compliance with federal 
standards, the Court occasionally has been willing to apply the recurring 
issue exception though the plaintiff has lost a personal interest in the 
dispute if the court considers the interests of a recognizable group to be at 
stake and sufficiently represented by the plaintiff. In Richardson v .  
Rarnire~,~9 for example, three ex-felons brought suit questioning the 
constitutionality of a Califonria law which disenfranchised convicted 
felons. The defendants registered the plaintiffs to vote but the California 
Supreme Court rejected the contention that the case was moot viewing 
the case as a class action presenting a matter of "broad public interest, . . . 
likely to recur,"40 and subsequently invalidated the questioned law.41 The 
United States Supreme Court decided the case on its merit~.4~ The Court 
determined that the case was not moot, and deemed significant the fact 
that the California Supreme Court had treated the case as a class action 
between all ex-felons and all election officials in the ~ ta te .~3  Similarly, 
- - 
38The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 41, 107 (1974) (" [C] urrent practice in 
the federal courts allows individuals who belonged to a class at the outset of litigation to con- 
tinue serving in a representative capacity after membership in the class has terminated, with- 
out regard to the applicability of exceptions to the mootness doctrine."); see note 67 infra. 
Another possible explanation for the Court's willingness to relax somewhat the require- 
ments for application of the recurring issue exception is the significant public interest in- 
volved in many actions which involve substantial numbers of people. See, e.g., American 
Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 770 n.1 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 737 n.8 (1974); 
Note, Mootness in the Supreme Court, 88 HARV. L. REV. 373, 388 (1974); Note, Mootness o n  
Appeal, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1672, 1685 (1970). Many state courts have recognized the judicial 
economy in deciding cases involving questions of great public interest when it is evident that 
the controversy meets the requirements for justiciability even though the case is moot as to 
the original plaintiff. State ex. rel. Steere v. Franklin County Farm Bureau, 172 Kan. 179, 
239 P.2d 570 (1951); Golden v. People ex  rel. Baker, 101 Colo. 381, 74 P.2d 715 (1937); First 
National Bank v. State, 65 P.2d 1154 (Arizona, 1937); Pitt v. Belote, 108 Fla. 246, 146 S. 380 
(1935); Piper v. Hawley 179 Cal. 10, 175 P. 419 (California, 1918). Federal courts, however, 
will not allow public interest alone as sufficient grounds to allow determination of a moot 
dispute, even though public interest is frequently mentioned when considering application 
of an exception to mootness. 
39418 U.S. 24 (1974). 
40Ramirez v. Brown, 9 Cal. 3d 199, 216-17, 507 P.2d 1345, 1347, 107 Cal. Rptr. 137, 149 
(1973). 
4lZd. at 216-17,507 P.2d at 1347, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 149. 
42418 U S  24,37 (1974). 
43Zd. The Court stated that: 
[W] hile the Supreme Court of California did not in so many words say that it was 
permitting respondents to proceed by way of a "class action," the fact that the Court's 
process recited that the named registrars were subject to it "individually and as repre- 
sentatives of the class of all other county clerks and registrars of voters," and the fact 
that the beneficiaries.. . were not merely the named appellants.. . indicates that the 
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in Moore v.  O g i l ~ i e , ~ ~  the Court applied the recurring issue exception 
in a case where no formal class action had been filed. In Moore the 
plaintiffs questioned the constitutionality of the statutory requirements 
in Illinois for presidential electors.45 In applying an exception to the 
mootness rule, the Court reasoned that the problem was capable of 
repetition and that the rights of all future candidates would be affe~ted.~G 
No suggestion was made that the original plaintiffs would likely be sub- 
jected again to the allegedly illegal election policies. 
In cases very similar to Moore, however, the Court, in its discretion, 
has characterized the plaintiff's case as seeking only personal relief and 
dismissed the case as moot once the plaintiff loses his stake in the out- 
come. An example of such a characterization is found in Brockington v .  
Rh~des,~'  where the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the 
congressional candidacy requirements in Ohio and sought as his sole 
relief to have his name placed on the ballot in the November 1968 elec- 
tion. Because the election had been held when the case reached the 
Supreme Court, the case was declared m00t.48 The Court did not apply 
the recurring issue exception because "the appellant did not allege that 
he intended to run for office in any future election" and did not consider 
the rights of those similarly situated because "of the limited nature of the 
relief sought. "49 
B. Voluntary Cessation of Allegedly Illegal Conduct. 
The recurring issue rationale also applies where a defendant attempts 
to avoid judicial inquiry into the legality of his conduct by simply teas- 
ing the activities that gave rise to the lawsuit.50 T o  allow a defendant to 
avoid possible adverse rulings from a court by merely discontinuing 
allegedly improper conduct would disserve justice since the defendant 
would retain the unrestricted potential to renew the improper conduct 
at any time in the future.5' The Court has thus consistently held that 
Court treated the action as one brought for the benefit of the class. . . . 
44394 U.S. 814 (1968). 
45Zd. at 815. 
46Zd. at 816. 
47396 U.S. 41 (1969). 
48Zd. at 44. 
491d. at 43. Both Moore and Brockington were election cases and involved plaintiffs whose 
cases had been arguably mooted by the passage of time. The similarity between Moore and 
Brockington serves to illustrate the substantial discretion available to the Court in moorness 
considerations. 
W n i t e d  States v. Mr. T. Grant Go., 345 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1952); Walling v. Helmerich & 
Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37, 43 (1944); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n., 166 U.S. 290, 
309 (1897); Securities & Exchange Commission v. Medical Committee, 404 U S .  403,406 (1973). 
S1The possibility that the defendant will resume the allegedly unlawful conduct in the 
future is, of course, the main justification for reaching the merits of a case where the de- 
1811 CASE NOTES 189 
voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not moot a case.52 
An example of the voluntary cessation exception is found in United 
States v .  Trans-Missouri Freight Ass0ciation.~3 In  that case the United 
States sought to have an allegedly unlawful combination enjoined from 
further activities. After prevailing in the lower courts, the defendant 
association dissolved itself before the Court could consider the merit of 
the plaintiff's appeal. The court declined, however, to dismiss the case 
as moot, reasoning that the plaintiff deserved to have its rights adjudi- 
cated regardless of the voluntary dissolution.54 Crucial to the decision 
was the Court's recognition that if the matter were deemed moot the 
defendant would be left with the unrestricted right to reorganize and to 
commit similar acts in the future. 
The Court has limited its application of the voluntary cessation excep- 
tion to those cases in which there exists a reasonable probability that the 
wrong will be repeated.55 
The Court found the dispute in DeFunis moot despite arguments by 
both parties to the contrary.56 Because the defendant had given his 
assurance that the plaintiff would be allowed to graduate, the Court con- 
cluded that the plaintiff no longer had a personal interest in the chal- 
fendant has discontinued the acts complained of prior to a judicial determination. Note, 
Federal Jurisdiction to Decide Moot Cases, 94 U. PA. L. &v. 125, 143 (1946) (Where a de- 
fendant goes out of business "for no apparent reason except that litigation is pending against 
him, the jurisdiction of the court is not defeated."); Walling v. Reuter Co., 321 U.S. 671 (1944); 
SEC v. Lawson, 24 F. Supp. 360 (D. Md. 1938). 
s2United States v. W. T .  Grant, 345 U.S. 629,632 (1952); see note 50 supra. 
53166 U.S. 290, 307-10 (1897). 
s4Zd. In Trans-Missouri the plaintiff was, of course, the public whose rights were brought 
to the attention of the court through its representative, the United States Government. 
Trans-Missouri illustrates the Court's use of the voluntary cessation exception in a dispute 
which had significant impact upon the general public. Although not applying a public 
interest exception per se, the Court relied heavily upon potential rights of the public which 
would go unresolved if the case were not heard. Id. 
55The "reasonable probability" test was first stated in United States v. Aluminum Company 
of America, 148 F.2d 416, 488 (2d Cir., sitting as court of last resort, 1945) ("To disarm the 
Court it must appear that there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated.") 
The test was adopted by the Supreme Court in United States v. W .  T .  Grant, 345 U.S. 629, 
633 (1952). 
In  cases where the defendant voluntarily agrees to satisfy the plaintiffs demands, the 
Court occasionally has held the defendant's statements reliable enough to moot the case. 
See, e.g., Gerende v. Elections Board, 341 U.S. 56 (1951) (statement by the government offi- 
cials of the State of Maryland that the words "by force or violence" would be added to a 
challenged loyalty oath for candidates for public office was considered sufficient to moot the 
issue); see also Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99, 107 (1971) (The court accepted a statement 
by Army officials that self-declared conscientious objectors would be given a chance to present 
their pleas for noncombat duty after induction.). 
56Brief for Petitioner at B 13 - B 18, Brief for Respondent at B 6 - B 9, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 
416 U.S. 312 (1974). 
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lenged admissions policy, and since no class action had been filed there 
was no longer a "definite and concrete" controversy for adjudication. 
In considering whether an exception to the mootness rule should be 
applied, the Court reasoned that the voluntary cessation exception was 
inappropriate because the defendant had not ceased the conduct com- 
plained of by the plaintifc rather, time and other circumstances had 
interacted to change the plaintiff's status to such an extent that the 
defendant's actions no longer affected him.57 The Court also held the 
recurring issue exception inapplicable since the plaintiff would soon 
graduate and never again be subjected to the admissions procedures, and 
it was unlikely the issue would "evade review" as a result of mootness if 
ever raised again? 
Four justices dissented,Jg arguing that a continuing controversy existed 
in that something might prevent the plaintiff from finishing the term 
then placing him in a position to be denied readmiss i~n .~~ The dissenters 
also argued that the voluntary cessation exception was applicable be- 
cause the defendant had voluntarily decided not to prevent the plaintiff's 
graduation and had failed to demonstrate there was not even a "mere 
possibility" that the plaintiff would be subjected to the challenged ad- 
missions poli~y.6~ 
571d. at 318. 
58Zd. at 319. The Court implicitly recognized the great public interest in the case but 
declined to consider the merits on that basis alone. 
591d. at 348. 
6OId. 
611d. at 349. The dissenters also urged that the public interest would be best served by an 
adjudication on the merits. Id. at 350. 
Upon concluding that the case was moot, the judgment was vacated and the cause re- 
manded to the Supreme Court of Washington "for such proceedings as by that court may 
be deemed appropriate." Id. at 320. I t  would also have been permissible for the Court to 
dismiss the appeal rather than vacate the lower court's judgment. The main justifications 
for vacating, as opposed to dismissing, the appeal are the possible collateral estoppel conse- 
quences if the lower court's judgment were permitted to stand, and the possibility of unjust 
unforeseen consequences. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950); New 
Orleans Flour Inspectors v. Glover, 160 U.S. 170 (1895); Comment, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 77, 93 
(1955) ("The Supreme Court has apparently adopted reversal of the lower court judgment of 
the disposition for moot appeals in an effort to prevent unforeseen and undesirable effects.") 
I t  is unclear why the Court vacated the Washington Supreme Court's judgment in DeFunis. 
I t  may have been because the Court did not want to give DeFunis stare decisis effect in Wash- 
ington. But, regardless of whether the decision was vacated or left standing, it will remain in 
the record and no doubt be referred to in the future. Comment, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 77, 93 
(1955) ("If the opinion below is officially reported, it will always remain in the volume; even 
if the decision is vacated, the force of the reasoning remains."). 
I t  is also doubtful whether the Court has the authority to vacate a state judgment which 
has become moot on appeal since state courts are not bound by article 111's case or controversy 
requirement and are, therefore, free to make their own determinations as to mootness. North 
Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971); Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 304 (1964); Note, 
Mootness in the Supreme Court, 88 HARV. L. REV. 373,393 n. 104 (1974). 
CASE NOTES 
By declaring DeFunis moot, the Court avoided the complex constitu- 
tional issues presented by the case.62 This decision not to reach the 
merits has support in the record and can be harmonized with the Court's 
prior holdings. Due to the flexibility of the mootness doctrine, however, 
it appears the Court could have, within its discretion, reached the merits, 
though to do so would have required considerable judicial manipula- 
tion of the mootness doctrine. 
The Court's determination that there was no continuing controversy 
between the parties is justifiable on the basis of the factual circumstances. 
Because the plaintiff had registered for his last quarter of law school 
he was no longer in a position to be affected by the admissions policy 
unless he failed to complete the q~a r t e r .~3  While it was possible that 
something could happen to prevent the plaintiff from completing his 
studies, it was too unlikely to justi5 a contrary conclusion by the 
Court. Since admittance to the law school was all the plaintiff sought, 
the Court was simply not in a position to grant any effective relief. 
It was also proper for the Court to determine not to apply the voluntary 
cessation exception. The plaintiff could no longer be affected by the 
defendant's admissions policy because of the passage of time and the 
plaintiff's normal progress in law school, not because of anything the 
defendant had done. Even if the Court had concluded that the defendant 
had voluntarily ceased the allegedly illegal conduct, it does not appear 
that the voluntary cessation exception would have been applicable. 
The application of this exception has always required a "reasonable 
expectation" that the defendant will return to his old ways and harm the 
plaintiff in the future.64 This reasonable expectation test was not met in 
DeFunis since it was improbable that the plaintiff would ever again be 
confronted with the admissions procedure. 
62Justice Brennan, in dissent, suggested that the reason for the Court's decision in DeFunis 
was because the Court did not want to address the important and complicated constitutional 
issues presented. 416 U.S. at 350. See also The  Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
43, 46 (1974) (" [I] t seems fair to conclude that factors other than the constitutional founda- 
tions of the mootness doctrine influenced last term's disputes over whether an action presented 
a live case or controversy.") citing Richardson v. Ramirez, 94 S. Ct. 2655 (1974); Village of 
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 94 S. Ct. 1536 (1974). 
63There also existed the probability that the plaintiff would seek admission to a graduate 
law program at the University or admission into one of the University's other graduate 
courses. This possibility, though not argued in the case, may have provided sufficient grounds 
for determining that the plaintiff was personally in jeopardy of being subjected to the dis- 
criminatory admissions procedures in the future, had the Court wished to construe it as such, 
since all University officials were named as defendants rather than only those connected 
with the law school. 
64The main justification for the voluntary cessation exception is that the defendant should 
not be permitted to avoid judicial determination of the propriety of his acts by simply refrain- 
ing from the alleged wrongful conduct and be left free to continue the conduct in the future. 
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). If there is no reasonable 
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The characterization of the plaintiff's case as totally personal rather 
than representing the rights of a class was crucial in the Court's deter- 
mination that the recurring issue exception was inappli~able.~5 Once so 
characterized, a summary determination that the recurring issue excep- 
tion was inappropriate sufficed since the Court has never invoked this 
exception without a reasonable probability that the parties' dispute 
would recur.@ In DeFunis, as stated above, there existed no such reason- 
able probability. 
I t  however, the plaintiff's action in DeFunis were characterized as 
representing the interests of a group, a stronger argument would exist 
for applying the recurring issue exception since it would be likely that 
someone in the represented group would be harmed by the questioned 
admissions practice in the future. The record supplies at least some sup- 
port for the proposition that DeFunis qualified as a group action. A sub- 
stantial number of people apply to the University of Washington Law 
School every year. Many of these applicants are no doubt similarly 
situated to the plaintiff in DeFunis and concerned with, and likely to be 
affected by, the outcome of his appeal. While it is true that DeFunis had 
not been filed as a class action67 the Court has not always required a 
formal class action in compliance with federal law before recognizing a 
group interest for purposes of invoking the recurring issue exception. 
In Moore v.  Ogzlvie,Bg for example, no class action had been filed, but 
the Court nevertheless applied the recurring issue exception in order to 
protect the future well-being of all persons affected by the election 
process in Illinois, though there was no allegation of future injury and 
no indication of concern over the possibility that the original plaintiffs 
would seek reelection. 
Even if the Court had chosen to characterize DeFunis as a group 
action, the recurring issue exception would have been inapplicable 
possibility that the defendant will recommit the challenged activity, then there is no justifica- 
tion for applying the exception. See note 51 supra. 
65The assumption by the majority that DeFunis represented a case in which the plaintiff 
was seeking only personal relief was not entirely justified. While it was true that the plaintiff 
brought the original action because he simply wanted to get in - and then out - of law 
school, subsequent developments in the case greatly increased the status of the case as one 
representing the rights of the members of a substantially large group of people. The plaintiff 
himself later sought to obtain class action status. See Plaintiffs Motion to Constitute Case a 
Class Action and Reinstate Judgment of the Superior Court, DeFunis v. Odegaard, No. 42198 
(Wash., filed May 1, 1974). 
66See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal and Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941); and note 
30 supra. 
6% cases filed as forma.1 class actions, the Court has allowed resolution on the merits 
despite the fact that the original plaintiff who brought the action has lost a personal interest 
in the outcome of the appeal. See, eg., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Sosna v. Iowa, 
95 S. Ct. 553, 558 (1975) ("Although the controversy is no longer live as to appellant Sosna, it 
remains very much alive for the class of persons she has been certified to represent."). 
68394 U.S. 814 (1968). 
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because the issue in DeFunis was not likely to evade subsequent review, 
a factor central to the application of this ex~eption.~g 
To  disregard the evading review requirement would eliminate one 
of the main theoretical bases for an exception to the mootness doctrine. 
The courts have long recognized the value of reaching the merits in 
arguably moot cases if the plaintiff would otherwise never have the 
opportunity for judicial review. But if a moot issue will not likely be 
moot the next time it is considered for review and the original plaintiff 
will no longer be affected by the challenged conduct, the Court will 
dismiss the case because no actual controversy exists between the parties. 
Harsh as it may sometimes be, the judiciary has long recognized the 
value in waiting until a real dispute exists before it will intervene. Any 
Washington state case, at least, which presented the same issue as DeFunis 
would reach the United States Supreme Court with relative haste since 
the Washington Supreme Court had already ruled on the matter.70 
Consequently, in order for the Court to reach the merits in DeFunis, 
it would have been necessary to characterize the case as a group action 
even though the plaintiff had not brought suit as such71 and to disregard 
the "evading review" requirement of the recurring issue exception. 
It is somewhat persuasive, however, that the Court should have 
reached the substantive issues in DeFunis because the case appeared to 
have the characteristics of a justiciable controver~y.~~ The filing of 26 
amici curiae briefs demonstrated the thorough presentation of the 
is~ues.~3 DeFunis was not lacking in adverseness. 
Another attractive argument in favor of reaching the merits in DeFunis 
was that the Court has always enjoyed substantial discretion in mootness 
determinations and was at liberty to exercise that discretion in reaching 
69See note 3 1 and accompanying text supra. 
70416 U.S. at 319. For the issue in DeFunis to receive expeditious review would require a 
case originating in Washington and challenging the admissions procedures of the University 
of Washington. While other law schools may have policies which also give preferential 
treatment to minority groups, the differences would likely be sufficient to require full adjudi- 
cation in the lower courts before reaching the U. S. Supreme Court on appeal. See also D. 
Kates, Jr. & W. Bailer, Mootness in Judicial Proceedings: Toward a Coherent Theory, 62 
CAL. L. REV. 1385, 1440 (1974). 
It should be noted that DeFunis presented the Court with a unique fact situation in that 
the plaintiff was in a position to control whether effective relief could be granted. The 
plaintiff could have avoided any mootness inquiry by not enrolling in his last quarter of 
school. In other cases where the passage of time has mooted the issue, the plaintiffs have 
not had such control over the situation. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 1 l3  (1973); Moore v. Ogilvie, 
394 U.S. 814 (1968). 
71416 U.S. at 314: "DeFunis brought the suit on behalf of himself alone, and not as the 
representative of any class. . . ." 
721n dissent, Mr. Justice Brennan states: "The case is. . . ripe for decision on a fully de- 
veloped factual record with sharply defined and fully canvassed legal issues." Id. at 350. 
73Zd. For a complete digest of the transcripts, documents, and briefs associated with 
DeFunis see 1 ,2 ,3  A. GINGER, DEFUNIS VERSUS ODEGAARD AND THE UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, 
THE UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS CASE (1974). 
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the important constitutional issues present in the case. It is otherwise 
difficult to reconcile the Court's decision in Brockington v .  R h ~ d e s ~ ~  
with that in Moore v .  Ogil~ie .~5 In both cases, the plaintiffs sought only 
personal relief and made no allegation of future injury. Nevertheless, 
Brockington was declared moot while Moore was determined on its 
merits. While it may be argued that the Court had greater interest in 
reaching the merits of Moore because the challenged conduct arose from 
one of the Court's prior decisions,76 it appears that the difference be- 
tween Moore and Brockington is best explained as an indication of the 
Court's discretion in mootness inquiries. But the Court has never con- 
sidered this discretion to be completely unfettered. The discretion was 
ai-ailable in Moore and Brockington because the issues would evade 
future review whereas DeFunis presented issues apparently capable of 
review in subsequent cases. Thus there was no clear precedent for reach- 
ing the merits in DeFunis; to have done so would have undercut the 
efficacy of the mootness doctrine by ignoring the constitutional demands 
of article I11 and leaving the Court free to utilize the doctrine precisely 
as it 
IV. CONCLUSION 
DeFunis left complex constitutional issues unresolved. Perhaps the 
public interest would have been better served had the Court confronted 
these issues. But mootness, at least in theory, has never been a respecter 
of issues and there existed no clear precedent for reaching the merits in 
DeFunis without expanding the Court's discretion to the point of 
eviscerating the mootness doctrine. 
- 
74396 U.S. 41 (1969). 
75394 U.S. 815. 
76MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1947). Another difference in the cases is the form 
of relief sought. I n  Brockington the plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus which is an extra- 
ordinary remedy under Ohio law (396 U.S. 41, 43-44 (1969)), while the plaintiffs in Moore 
sought declaratory relief and an injunction (394 U.S. 815 (1968)). But since the courts were 
equipped to grant the requested relief in either case, this distinction does not appear vital 
in a mootness determination. 
771t has been suggested by several commentators that the mootness doctrine should be 
ignored in any case which involves the rights of a substantial group of people. See Singer, 
Justiciability and Recent Supreme Court Cases, 21 ALA. L. REV. 229, 268 (1969); Comment, 
Mootness and Ripeness: T h e  Postman Always Rings Twice, 65 G L U M .  L. REV. 867, 875 
(1965). But it does not appear that so drastic a repudiation of a constitutional doctrine 
founded in the common law is necessary. See Note, Mootness in the Supreme Court, 88 HARV. 
L. h v .  373,389 n.84 (1974). 
